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The main purpose of this thesis is to explore dynamic discussions on 
deliberative democracy and to suggest a feasible deliberative system.  In 
contemporary societies, democracy is considered as an ideal system of 
government. However, sustainability of democracies is threatened by 
increasing social fragmentation and political alienation. In order to 
overcome these situations, political theorists and practitioners try to adopt 
deliberative governance.  
Starting from normative justification, the recent trend of deliberative 
democracy begins to receive broad coverage in practical discussion of 
democracy. However, recently, many scholars cast doubt on the impact of 
deliberation because they get unconnected and even undesirable results from 





complementary relationship between deliberation and the current 
mechanism should be clearly stated. I think the success of establishing 
pragmatic and beneficial deliberative system depends on how we set 
priorities in democratic system and specify the roles of deliberation. Amy 
Gutmann and Dennis Thompson do not suggest a concrete way of 
institutionalizing deliberation. However, based on the Gutmann and 
Thompson’s deliberative democracy, I think we can suggest a useful 
guideline for deliberative system. 
First of all, I explore the efficacy of deliberation. According to Gutmann 
and Thompson, a purpose of deliberation is not to find a common goal but 
to promote mutual respect and produce considered opinions. In reality, 
people tend to avoid deliberation because they think it leads to polarization. 
However, the real problem is rejecting to solve conflicts. Continued 
deliberation of clarifying preferences may lead to find mutual benefits. In 
long-run, deliberation will promote social harmony. Also, in order to build a 
deliberative system, we have to consider the relationship between 
deliberation and other forms of political activity. Deliberative element 
cannot have the same importance to all phases of a political decision process. 
Therefore, deliberative institutions should be supported by ‘compromising 





Secondly, I examine whether deliberation process has to manage moral 
conflict or interest conflict. According to Gutmann and Thompson, moral 
conflict is a fundamental problem of democracy. However, it does not 
exclude interest conflict. It is important to build a deliberation stage that any 
interest should be stated. 
Lastly, I examine the deliberative competency of citizens. Deliberative 
democrats used to distinguishing between elites’ deliberation and lay 
people’s deliberation. However, I suggest that we should create a joint 
deliberation between experts and lay citizens. In this kind of deliberation, 
elites and lay citizens can check each other. Although their effects are not 
proven by measurement, number of forums are increasing and forum 
processes are evolving. People learn how to deliberate from deliberation.  
Based on the Gutmann and Thompson’s deliberative democracy, I believe 
that we can suggest a useful guideline for establishing a deliberative system, 
which incorporates external and internal, micro and macro, elite and lay 
public deliberations with other forms of political activity.  
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I. Introduction: Why Deliberative Democracy? 
 
 
The aim of this paper is to explore dynamic discussions on deliberative 
democracy and suggest a feasible deliberative system. Democratic theorists 
have tried to embrace a deliberative process in order to make democracy 
more sustainable. However, recently, many scholars cast doubt on the 
impact of deliberation because they get unconnected and even undesirable 
results from empirical studies on deliberation. In order to defend 
deliberation, the complementary relationship between deliberation and the 
current mechanism should be clearly stated. I think the success of 
establishing a pragmatic and beneficial deliberative system depends on how 
we set priorities in democratic system and specify the role of deliberation.  
I suggest that Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson’s deliberative 
democracy should be a guiding notion for institutionalizing deliberative 
systems. 
In contemporary societies, democracy is considered as an ideal system of 
government. However, sustainability of democracies is threatened by 
increasing social fragmentation and political alienation. Many scholars 





faction and a place for competing private interests. Some people say that the 
current electoral process is modeled on the analogy of the market. Like 
producers, politicians and parties formulate their positions and devise their 
strategies in response to the demand of voters.1 For example, Twain (2007) 
points out that the U.S. Congress and state legislatures are largely incapable 
of enacting sound public policy for the public interest because the current 
elections are dominated by big money and special interest.2 In order to 
overcome these situations, political theorists and practitioners try to adopt 
deliberative governance.  
Democracy that considers deliberative democracy as a way of life is 
strong democracy. Elstub and McLaverty (2014) say that deliberative 
democracy is very much the zeitgeist. Deliberative democracy suggests a 
new democratic paradigm. It affirms the need to justify decisions made by 
citizens. 3  In other words, it emphasizes transformation and citizen 
empowerment on the political process. Starting from normative justification, 
the recent deliberative democracy scholars try to cover various practical 
discussions.  
                                            
1 Gutmann and Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy?, p. 14. 
2 Twain (2007) argues that elections should be reconstructed entirely to minimize the 
interests of special interests, and elicit values. 





Academics’ interest in deliberative democracy has been intense since 
John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas advocated it. Rawls and Habermas debate 
the normative justifications of deliberative democracy. John Rawls suggests 
a “well-ordered” constitutional democratic regime. In Political Liberalism, 
he explores the legitimate use of political power in a democracy and shows 
how unity may be achieved despite the various worldviews that free 
institutions allow. He argues that the use of political power must fulfill a 
criterion of reciprocity.4 Rawls suggests that individuals should perform a 
thought experiment under the condition, in which a veil of ignorance 
obscures personal interest. Rawls considers his work makes a practical 
contribution to solving the long-standing conflict between liberty and 
equality.5 
Habermas suggests a new paradigm of law that goes beyond dichotomies 
                                            
4 “Our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance 
with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonable be 
expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human 
reason (Rawls 1993, p137).” 
5 Rawls suggests four roles of political philosophy. The first role is practical. Political 
philosophy can find a base for reasoned agreement in a society where sharp divisions 
threaten to lead to conflict. The second role of political philosophy is to help citizens to 
orient themselves with their own social world. The third role is to describe workable 
political arrangements that can gain support from real people. The fourth role of political 





between liberals and civic republicans. His early work on deliberative 
democracy shows a commitment to consensus decisions, which would be 
based on free and equal deliberation among participants. 6  Later, he 
develops a two-track approach. He argues that the public opinion that made 
by the deliberation of the people in the public sphere should feed policy 
process.7 One of the important contributions made by the first generation of 
deliberative democrats is that they thought that the exchange of reasons 
would result in preference change and consensus. However, critics argue 
that they fail to take account of the complexity of contemporary societies. 
Many are dissatisfied because Habermas's emphasis on the transcendental 
grounds of reason appears overly abstract.8 Habermas’s account neglects 
the role of social movements. It reflects an inattention to agency.9 
Bohman (1996) and Gutmann and Thompson (1996) take the dynamics 
among social conditions seriously. They suggest a form of democracy more 
practically achievable. Bohman (1996) develops a realistic model of 
deliberation by analyzing several problems that deliberative democracy 
faces. According to him, the challenge for democratic theory is to identify 
                                            
6 Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action Vol.1, 2. 
7 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms. 
8 Chriss, “Review essays of Jurgen Habermas’s Between Facts and Norms.” 





the essential norms of democratic polity, which can be realized in respect to 
the social facts, such as cultural pluralism, social inequalities, social 
complexity, and community. He suggests public deliberation is convincing 
because of its persuasive effects offered by the various lines of participants’ 
arguments. In order to achieve deliberative success, he claims that citizens 
need to perceive that they have enough of an impact on deliberations and 
continue to cooperate. But this idea simply requires participants to be 
equally situated with respect to one another and to perceive that they are 
acting autonomously. In this regard, critics wonder whether this is the same 
as achieving a rational agreement between free and equal persons.10 
Deliberative democracy has been discussed rigorously until early 2000s. 
Gutmann and Thompson’s Democracy and Disagreement contributed 
significantly to these debates. Gutmann and Thompson (1996) attempt to 
diverge from the theories of Habermas and of Rawls.11 They argue that 
deliberative democracy includes both the procedural and constitutional 
values of conventional theories of democracy. Gutmann and Thompson’s 
theory takes moral disagreement seriously for the principles and practices of 
democracy. According to Gutmann and Thompson, moral disagreements 
                                            
10 Owen, “Review Essay: Deliberative democracy.”  





cannot be settled at the beginning of the procedural process or at the 
judgment by constitutional referees. Proceduralists assume that if citizens 
agree some rule of game, moral disagreements can be removed from the 
political agenda. Then, what remains is political bargaining. For 
Constitutionalists, they assume that citizens agree on moral value and, 
therefore, have no more to say about moral disagreements. However, in 
reality, there are reasonable moral disagreements about what procedures 
democracy requires, what fundamental value citizen holds, and how both 
should be interpreted (Gutmann and Thompson 2004, pp. 26 – 29).  
In response to Gutmann and Thompson’s deliberative theory, Deliberative 
Politics devoted entirely to discussions of Democracy and Disagreement.12 
It includes penetrating critiques on Gutmann and Thompson’s conception of 
deliberative theory. In response to these critiques, Gutmann and Thompson 
(2004) point out several questions towards the empirization of deliberative 
                                            
12 Deliberative Politics: Essay on Democracy and Disagreement (1996) suggests critical 
essays on the themes of Democracy and Disagreements. According to “Introduction” 
written by Stephen Macedo, the critical essays that follows fall into two parts. The first 
groups thinks that Gutmann and Thompson put too much emphasis on the deliberative 
components of democratic politics. The second group of essays concede that deliberation is 
an appropriate response to the enduring fact of moral conflict. They suggest that Gutmann 
and Thompson’s version of deliberation needs to be reformulated or that deliberation 





democracy.13 As an effort to make deliberative democracy survives and 
even prospers, Gutmann and Thompson keep trying to broaden and reframe 
some of these ideas.  
Lately, debates on deliberative democracy have taken an ‘empirical turn’ 
(Dryzek, 2008). Deliberative theory has matured by empirical experiments 
and experience of deliberation practitioners. The empirical evidence on 
deliberative democracy gives a sense of what may work. There are various 
case studies on deliberative opinion polls and citizen assemblies. Smith and 
Wales (2000), Leib (2004), and Parkinson (2006) suggest the 
supplementation of existing structures with deliberative mechanisms such as 
citizen’s juries. 14  However, some scholars doubt on desirability and 
feasibility of a large scale deliberative system. Other deliberative scholars 
focus on programs designed to improve the public judgment through 
carefully designed deliberative forum. For instance, Melville, Taylor, 
Willingham and Dedrick (2003) show that a growing number of 
                                            
13 Because the conditions of actual democratic politics fall short of substantive standards of 
free and equal citizenships, it produces unjust outcomes. Deliberative democracy itself 
exposes the exclusionary biases in democratic practice that undermine the conditions of 
civic equality that its principles defend (Gutmann and Thompson 2004, 48).  Although 
deliberative democratic theory is not committed to particular institutional reform of this 
kind, it does call for changes that would eliminate those biases in the political process that 
derive from unequal wealth and entrenched power (Gutmann and Thompson 2012).  





communities applies the theoretical principles of the forums to frame their 
own local issues. They show that these communities use deliberation to 
make thoughtful decisions based on a common understanding of an issue, 
and the costs and benefits of their shared decision. Second, there are efforts 
to construct a set of deliberation models that involve governmental agencies. 
Grimes (2008)’s empirical analysis on the meetings centered around 
whether to continue construction on a railway tunnel near the town of 
Båstad in southwestern Sweden. He points out that public deliberations 
seldom fully satisfy the communicative criteria stipulated in normative 
theory. However, findings suggest that even imperfect deliberation may 
have the potential to generate civic goods. Third, there are studies of 
deliberation programs, which seek to foster more deliberative civic culture. 
Carole, Kesler and Schwinn (2003) study on civic organizations, learning 
democratic centers empower ordinary citizens. Potapchuk, Carlson, and 
Kennedy (2003) show how collaborative initiatives between government 
and civic organizations promote the community’s capacity for effective 
citizen engagement on public issue.15  
Gutmann and Thompson (2004) argue that 
“The future of deliberative democracy depends on whether its proponents can 
                                            





create institutions that enable deliberation to work well.”16  
Nowadays, deliberative democrats have hard time creating deliberative 
institutions since deliberative democrats have not proven its institutional 
impact. The role of deliberation still remains ambiguous. Generally, there 
are two main reasons. First, there are lacking connections among empirical-
based studies.17 Second, scholars and practitioners do not communicate 
consistently.18 Although there have been various analysis on experiences of 
deliberation, there is a prevalent distinction between micro and macro 
strategies for institutionalizing deliberative democracy. In addition to these 
two reasons, I argue that the role of deliberation have not been clearly stated 
because scholars conduct their researches without having a specified 
guiding notion. In order to make deliberative democracy more persuasive, 
we need to establish a specified notion, in which deliberative system can be 
successfully integrated to democratic institutions.19 
                                            
16 Gutmann and Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy?, p. 59. 
17 Beste, “Contemporary Trends of Deliberative Research: Synthesizing a New Study 
Agenda.” 
18 Gastil and Levine, “The Future Direction for Public Deliberation, Deliberative.” 
19 Elstub and Mclaverty (2013, p. 6) summarize the definitions of micro and macro 
deliberation suggested by Hendrik (2006). Micro deliberative democracy focuses on ideal 
deliberative procedures, within small-scale structured arenas within the state, oriented to 
decision-making, with impartial participants deliberating together in one place and at one 





Gutmann and Thompson (1996) try to show the kind of deliberation that 
is possible and desirable in the face of moral disagreement in democracies. 
Deliberative democracy is not an alternative model to the existing form of 
democracy. They argue that the principles of deliberative democracy help 
sustain a conception of democracy with a capacity for moral improvement. 
Gutmann and Thompson say that their theory can be a critical tool for 
assessing the current political problems. They offer some assessments on the 
U.S legislative cases. In my opinion, their suggestion is passive adjustment 
of deliberative theory to practical discussions.  
In order to realize deliberation well in practice, the complementary 
relationship between deliberation and the current mechanism should be 
clearly suggested. Gutmann and Thompson do not suggest a concrete way of 
institutionalizing deliberation in reality. However, based on the Gutmann 
and Thompson’s deliberative democracy, I believe that we can suggest a 
useful guideline for deliberative system, which incorporates the external and 
internal, micro and macro, elite and lay public deliberations with other 
forms of political activity.  
Gutmann and Thompson’s deliberative theory depends on a number of 
                                                                                                               
discursive communication that occurs across space and time, aiming at opinion formation, 
within civil society, outside and often against formal decision-making institutions of the 





key assumptions regarding the efficacy of deliberation, the nature of 
political contestation and capacities and inclinations of individuals. In 
chapter II, I explore the efficacy of deliberation. According to Gutmann and 
Thompson, a purpose of deliberation is not to find a common goal but to 
promote mutual respect and produce considered opinions. People tend to 
avoid deliberation in order to avoid polarization. However, the real danger is 
rejecting the possibility to solve the problem. Citizens should not afraid of 
expressing one’s ideas. In long-run, deliberation will promote the 
deliberation that empower citizens, and common understanding. In this 
chapter, I also examine the forms of political activity. In order to build a 
deliberative system, we have to consider the relationship between 
deliberation and other forms of political activity. In order to make 
deliberation coexist with other forms of politics, such as identity politics and 
participatory politics, compromising mindset and ‘deliberative within’ 
should be emphasized in civil society. Chapter III deals with the nature of 
political contestation. I examine whether deliberation process deals with 
moral conflict or with interest conflict. According to Gutmann and 
Thompson, moral conflict does not exclude interest conflict. Therefore, it is 
important to build deliberative stages that any interest can be stated. Chapter 





democrats are used to distinguishing elite’s role and lay people’s role. 
However, I suggest that we should create a joint deliberation, which 
includes experts and lay citizens at the same time. In helps experts and lay 
people to check each other. In conclusion, I would like to suggest how an 






II. The Efficacy of Deliberation 
 
The early deliberative democracy scholarship put efforts into 
achieving justifiable compromise through deliberation as much as possible. 
However, critics argue that deliberation does not always result in 
convergence. They suggest that deliberation exacerbates the extremist 
potential of democratic politics and threaten social harmony. On other hands, 
some critics argue that deliberative democracy concern too little about other 
forms of political activity, such as contestation. They point out that demands 
for consensus and the common good may marginalize members of 
disadvantaged groups. Several empirical studies show that officials express 
uncompromising ideas in order to achieve some particular goal in public 
deliberation.  
Moved away from seeking consensus and common good, Gutmann 
and Thompson state that achieving mutual respect is the most important 
requirement in deliberation. That means, their argument does not overlook 
the critics’ ideas. Gutmann and Thompson recognize that deliberation does 
not always guarantee social justice under the current situations when power 





deliberative forum. 20  Gutmann and Thompson acknowledge that 
deliberation should include alternative forms of interaction.21 However, 
deliberative inclusiveness can overstretch the conception of deliberation.22 
Instead of adopting alternative forms uncritically, the kind of inclusion may 




1. The Promise of Deliberation 
The so-called first generation of deliberative democracy has focused 
mostly on the benefits of deliberation. For example, in the early 
philosophical writings of Jürgen Habermas (1991) and Joshua Cohen (1989), 
both writers emphasize consensus formation. They have hoped that 
                                            
20 Gutmann and Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy?, p.48. 
21 In “Contemporary Trends of Deliberative Research: Synthesizing a New Study Agenda,” 
Beste suggests that there are three desirable trends of deliberative research – the 
empirization of deliberative theory, the relationship of input, output and outcome of 
deliberation, and the conceptual opening and inclusiveness of deliberative theory. 
Following his suggestions, I want to to extract certain features of deliberation shared by 
deliberative democrats.    
22 Steiner (2012) focuses on the interplay between normative and empirical aspects of 
deliberation. He points out that Habermas exclude narratives. He suggests that story-telling 
happens at both elite and mass level. But he also notices that the deliberative model should 





deliberation might transform individuals who had previously seen a 
situation from the perspective of “I” come to think as “we.”23 Gutmann and 
Thompson also argue that, if politics is the art of the possible, the 
compromise is the soul of democracy.24 They emphasize the importance of 
mutual respect and compromising mindset (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996; 
2004; 2012). Gutmann and Thompson claim that mutual respect is necessary 
to sustain any morally justifiable democracy under the modern conditions of 
deep and persistent disagreement. They argue that the compromising 
mindset is key to improve on the status quo. 
Gutmann and Thompson say that compromise is difficult, but governing a 
democracy without compromise is impossible.25 They argue that there will 
be less polarization after public discussion. The following sentences 
summarize the key idea:  
“Deliberative democracy as a form of government in which free and equal which 
they give one another reasons that are mutually acceptable and generally accessible, 
with the aim of reaching conclusions that are binding in the present on all citizens 
but open to challenge in the future (Gutmann and Thompson 2004, pp. 6-7).”  
                                            
23 Mansbridge, Hartz-Karp, Amengual and Gastil, “Norms of Deliberation: An Inductive 
Study,” p.23.  
24 Gutmann and Thompson, “Is there room for political compromise in an era of permanent 
campaigning?” 
25 Gutmann and Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement; Gutmann and Thompson, Why 





Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson’ Democracy and Disagreement is 
a turning point of deliberative theories. Gutmann and Thompson (1996) take 
complexity of societies seriously and offer substantive details to strengthen 
the concept of deliberative democracy. They recognize that a deliberation 
conceptualized as a decision-making talk is inappropriate. The conception of 
deliberative democracy consists of three principles - reciprocity, publicity, 
and accountability - that regulate the process of politics, and three others - 
basic liberty, basic opportunity, and fair opportunity- that govern the content 
of policies.26 According to them, this conception of deliberative democracy 
diminishes the deficit in theory and in politics. Reciprocity is a principle 
related to how we speak with open-mindedness. Publicity involves the 
public context of political debate and decision-making. Accountability 
concerns about the potential conflicts between representatives and their 
constituents.  
Deliberation is a way of achieving ‘the economy of moral disagreement.’  
Gutmann and Thompson (2012) emphasize the importance of 
‘compromising mindset.’ They claim that systematic rejection of 
compromise is problematic for any democracy because it favors the status 
quo. Especially, Gutmann and Thompson point out that a campaign is a 
                                            





zero-sum activity. For example, they assess and criticize the inequality case 
of campaign financing in the United States. Campaign contributions, which 
come disproportionately from wealthy citizens and well-organized groups, 
influence who runs for office and the policies. Targeting is the foundation of 
virtually every aspect of campaign strategy. Campaigning requires directing 
attention to a party’s most likely supporters. When parties enter into 
negotiations in bad faith, they intentionally misrepresent their opponents’ 
position and refuse to cooperate even on the matters on which they can find 
agreement.  
Gutmann and Thompson (2004) say that the process of deliberative 
democracy is dynamic. That means, even though citizens do not reach an 
agreement, they stand a greater chance of finding agreement through 
deliberation. Practicing the economy of moral disagreement promotes the 
value of mutual respect because it promotes citizens and their 
representatives work together and find common ground. Some critics argue 
that, although a deliberative process that express mutual respect, 
deliberation produces an unjust outcome. Yet, the coauthors strongly argue 







2. Limits of Deliberation 
Some scholars argue that greater amount of information about a policy 
may result in an increased polarization of public opinion. According to 
Sunstein (2002), deliberation leads to an increased polarization of beliefs 
between groups. He suggests three reasons why group talks result in 
extreme voices. First of all, it is due to an exchange of new information. 
People are telling one another simply what they know, and this kind of 
telling is often skewed in a predictable direction. Secondly, corroboration 
occurs. When people share their view, they become more confident on their 
views. Third, some people might want to show that they are not timid. The 
author worries that even if the average view of a large group is likely to be 
right, a process of deliberation makes distorted opinions.  
Like this, in certain circumstances, deliberation may produce a distortion. 
However, we do not have to conclude that deliberation leads people to go 
extreme. In order to defend deliberation in practice, we need to specify the 
idea of deliberation. When assessing this kind of talk by the principles of 
reciprocity, accountability and publicity, we can conclude that people do not 
consider other groups’ perspective the previous kind of talk. The way of 
expressing their ideas in group talks seems to be more similar to a targeting 





talk results in polarization due to the lack of compromising mindset. While 
worrying about the negative impacts of group talk, Sustsein mentions that 
there are also good extreme talks. For example, entrepreneurs, scientists, 
disabled people, economists and elderly can assemble and discuss their 
extreme ideas in ‘enclave talk,’ and they promote learning, creativity, and 
innovation. These good extreme cases are similar to the deliberation that 
Gutmann and Thompson have suggested. ‘Enclave deliberation’ promotes 
the development of positions that would otherwise be ignored in general 
debate.  
Like Gutmann and Thompson’s belief, Sustein admits that the public 
forum promotes some important social goals. Group talks can play positive 
roles when the public forum embraces bipartisan membership. Firstly, 
speakers can access to a wide array of people. Secondly, speakers can access 
not only to heterogeneous people but also to whom they have complaint. 
Third, the public forum allows people be exposed to a wide variety of 
people and views. Sunstein suggests that bipartisan membership is required 
for some of the most important institutions.27 Following this argument, the 
opinion made in enclave deliberation can be checked by exposure to 
                                            
27 See Sunstein (2008). He lists some important legislative institutions: The National Labor 
Relations Board, the Federal Communication Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, 





opinions of other enclave groups. In this situation, deliberation plays 
important role for both identifying one’s own idea and sharing it to others.  
Some critics point out that there is a tension between sharing different 
opinions and maintaining integration. For example, Mutz (2006) says that 
exposure to diverse political viewpoints may be widely advocated in theory, 
but it is much less popular in actual practice because there is trade-off 
between promoting deliberation and preserving social harmony. The author 
suggests that political theorists need to expand their definitions of 
deliberation beyond the ideal type because the ideal speech is impossible to 
achieve.28 The author’s central concern is with the extent to which people’s 
networks involve like-minded versus non-like-minded discussion partners. 
29 According to her,  
“Although diverse political networks foster a better understanding of multiple 
perspectives on issues and encourage political tolerance, they discourage political 
participation, particularly among those who are averse to conflict (p.3).”  
In other words, the author claims that people avoid taking potentially 
                                            
28 Mutz(2006) questions on Habermas’ concept of ideal speech. 
29 Network: the people with whom a given person communicates on direct, one-to-one 
basis.  
Contexts: larger entities (neighborhoods, workplaces, cities…) whose characteristics are 
typically known to the researcher strictly in aggregate form and are known to the individual 





controversial positions because there is the tension between promoting a 
society with participative citizens and promoting respect for differences of 
opinion. For example, different political opinions are more easily 
maintained and more beneficially aired with one’s dentist than with a close 
friend of family member.30 This American case is not an exception. Many 
other cultures also pursue social harmony.31 Min (2013) suggests that the 
Easterners are usually influenced by the social harmony.32 They prefer such 
communication strategies as integration rather than strategies as strong 
opinion expression. 
Mutz (2006) argues that deliberative theorists have not suggested in 
concrete terms how people might interact with one another in mixed 
company while simultaneously pursuing active lives as political citizens. 
For the solution, Mutz (2006) constructs middle-range theory through 
                                            
30 Mutz, Hearing the Other Side, p. 2.  
31 Sanders (1997) and Young (2000) also have offered a critique involving cultural issue 
saying that deliberation is entrenched in the elitist white-masculine culture in which 
deliberation must be calm and rational. 
Min (2014) suggests that the issue of culture is vital to advance deliberation theories and 
practices. According to him, deliberation theories and research should be expanded so that 
they can include more cultural sensibilities. In Western Polling, is to pay more attention to 
other dimensions of deliberation. 
32 Min (2014) suggests that, in Western deliberation scholarship, the main focus has been 






differentiation between normative needs and requirements of successful 
procedural deliberation and preferable outcomes. 
Gutmann and Thompson do not ignore the tension suggested by Diana 
Mutz. Gutmann and Thompson (2012) differentiate discussions of 
compromise from the discussion of the two-agent, one-time interaction. 
They assume that, in deliberation, members maintain continuing 
relationships with one another, and deal concurrently with a wide range of 
issues that have multiple parts and long-range effects. They suggest that 
deliberation is a regularized activity, pursuing long-term goal. From this, we 
can infer that when people concern about broad range of problems and long-
term effects, they need to express their ideas. Social harmony can be 
achieved through increasing deliberation.  
Some skeptics suggest other reasons that deliberation may result in 
polarization. Stasavage (2007) suggests that the failure of deliberation to 
reduce polarization of beliefs is due to the public decision making procedure. 
He investigates the effect of the public versus private decision making on 
opinion polarization. According to him, the existing work have emphasized 
that public debate helps to reduce polarization but, when debate takes place 
between representatives, the polarization increases.  Representatives 





different polities because they face incentives to use their actions as a signal 
of loyalty to their constituents in the public decision ma They intentionally 
ignore private information about the true desirability of different policies. 
For this reason, constituents will not alter their prior policy belief in this 
type of debate. On the other hands, when representatives make policy 
decision in private, they are more likely to allow private information to 
influence actions. In addition, Checkel (2005) also describes that, in the EU 
committee meeting, frank exchanges of information is more likely to occur 
in private than in public. That is because, when EU committees that hold 
public sessions, members have a tendency to present prepared speeches. In 
sum, Stasavage and Checkel implicitly show that publicity hinders making 
mutual respect. However, meaning of transparency in the cases of Stasavage 
(2007) and Checkel (2005) is different from Gutmann and Thompson’s 
principle of publicity. Publicity is not merely speaking to others publicly. It 
should involve the public context of political debate and decision-making. 
According to Gutmann and Thompson (1996), the publicity principle in 
government encourages officials to give reasons for their decisions and 
policies.  
Gutmann and Thompson are open to the idea that recent form of 





deliberative theory.33 Gutmann and Thompson say that deliberation does 
not necessarily entail consensual outcomes. Throughout preference 
clarification rather than transformation, it increases inter-factional 
compromises.  
In order to avoid polarization, two suggestions can be inferred from 
Gutmann and Thompson’s theory. First of all, it is important to make people 
to think about wide range of deliberation and long-term effects of 
deliberation. Secondly, representatives should make their arguments based 
on the principle of publicity. Without expressing one’s opinion, conflicting 
interests are suppressed rather than clarified. 34  A deliberative system 
requires a culture that explicitly celebrates disagreement as an activity.35 
Holt-Shannon and Mallory (2014) believe that effective deliberations may 
include highly contested positions in which intimidation or bullying can 
occur. In the future, continued deliberation of clarifying preferences may 
lead to find mutual benefits. 
                                            
33 Chambers (2003) suggests that “Deliberative theory has moved away from a consensus-
centered teleology—contestation and indeed the agonistic side of democracy now have 
their place—and it is more sensitive to pluralism.” More generally, she finds that “the 
exchange between diversity theory and deliberative theory has helped to make the latter 
more concrete” 
34 Karpowitz and Mansbridge, “Disagreement and Consensus: The Need for Dynamic 
Updating in Public Deliberation.”  





Gutmann and Thompson’s efforts to economize moral disagreements do 
not mean deliberation can eradicate moral disagreements. Based on this idea, 
when we conceive a deliberative system, we should aim not only to resolve 
moral conflicts but also to accept the existence of disagreement. It may 
seem time-consuming and inefficient but, in long-run, our efforts to 
deliberate time and energy spent will be compensated. For instances, the 
good case of extreme ideas challenges manipulation of power and help to 
find a common ground. Cross-border talks and public conversations prevent 
serious injustice. The real danger lies in the rejection of providing a proper 




3. Forms of Political Activity  
Some democrats criticize deliberative democracy for failing to 
recognize that democratic politics necessarily involves the clash of opposite. 
Mouffe(2000) argues that a model of democracy in terms of ‘agonistic 
pluralism’ can help us to involve the main challenge facing democratic 
politics today better. He proposes that emphasis on consensus and the 





participation. He points out that deliberative democracy model denies the 
dimension of undecidability and the ineradicability of antagonism, which 
are constitutive of ‘the political.’ Young (2001) says that social activists 
have many doubts about deliberative practice. He claims that the organizers 
of deliberation overlook situations in which confrontational tactics are more 
suitable since they define deliberation less rigidly that classic philosophers 
do. In classic philosophical texts, the writers define deliberation as the 
essence of democracy that equate it with reasonableness or rationality. 
Simon (1999) argues that putting too much emphasis on the search for 
mutually acceptable reasons may undermine political energy of some groups, 
such as marginalized group. Walzer (1999)  claims that a world where 
political conflict, class struggle, and ethnic and religious differences are all 
replaces by pure deliberation is not the utopia that any deliberative 
democrats should defend. Lasse (2007) argues that the idea that Gutmann 
and Thompson made is marked by undecidability. For instance, reciprocity 
does not yield ‘determinate resolutions’ of such case of Mozert.36 He 
concludes that deliberation process itself does not bring out the better 
                                            
36 Mozert case is “the case, which started in 1983, involved a number of Christian 
fundamentalist parents in Hawkins County, Tennessee, who objected to a particular set of 
school books (the so-called Holt readers) used in the public school their children went to 





outcome than the current process based on aggregative mechanism.  
As stated above, exclusion is an ongoing problem for democracies. In 
order to make deliberation more inclusive, many scholars offer alternatives 
to deliberation. Dryzek (2002) addresses deliberative democracy excessively 
rely on the state structure as the main locus for decision-making and does 
not allow arguments on race and gender. Therefore, he prefers democracy to 
become ‘discursive democracy.’ Ryfe (2005) specifically conceptualizes 
deliberation to include everyday reasoning habits. Young (1996), Sanders 
(1997) and Mansbridge (2006) offer alternative forms of deliberation that 
may go beyond the limitation of deliberation. Young (1996) argues that the 
process of deliberation should be opened up to participants disadvantaged 
by traditional elite understandings of “reason-giving” by adding the 
elements of greeting, rhetoric, and storytelling.37 Sanders (1997) points out 
that more inclusive talk would add more accessible ways of communicating, 
including ‘testimony,’ or stating one’s own perspective in one’s own words. 
Testimony is a statement that gives public voice to a critical stance of some 
individual or group. It does not need to present a perspective that can be 
justifiable to other individuals or groups.  
                                            
37 According to Young (l996),  “greeting” is explicit mutual recognition and conciliatory 
caring, “rhetoric” is forms of speaking, such as humor, that reflexively attend to the 





In response to these alternative suggestions, Gutmann and Thompson 
agree that representatives are more likely to arrive at a mutually justifiable 
political agreement by listening to the testimony. However, they argue that, 
without deliberation, testimony leaves the difference unresolved. Therefore, 
they insist that deliberation should be the core in political process, as a 
method of mediating conflicts.  
Moreover, Gutmann and Thompson point out that the critics’ arguments 
also have flaws. They suggest that allowing unlimited activist actions may 
have negative consequences on other groups or individuals who have not 
taken part. Based on this idea, it is important to build a deliberative system 
that allow active civil society while promoting compromising mindset. 
Gutmann and Thompson (1996) argue that civil society must remain 
unstructured in order to allow for free-will formation. For instance, 
Gutmann and Thompson say identity politics has important role in civil 
society. In Identity in Democracy, Gutmann evaluates the growth of identity 
politics, including identity politics based on race, gender. Gutmann contends 
that participation in such associations can have not only a positive impact on 
individual members but also encourage the development of the reciprocal 
trust and understanding among citizens, which is critical to the success of 





Gutmann argues that we need to distinguish between those demands of 
identity groups that aid justice and those that impede justice. Through 
deliberation, citizens can modify other activities. It makes more public-
spirited in both process and outcome. Allowing free formation of 
associations in civil society can strengthen the understanding among citizens.  
Hendriks (2006) says informal, open, and unstructured deliberation in 
civil society can shape public opinion and political institution.38 Hendriks 
promotes an integrated deliberative system. 39  He suggests a ‘mixed 
discursive sphere.’ Hendriks recognizes that deliberation occurs in a variety 
of public venues and names it discursive sphere.40 He claims that a more 
integrated deliberative system would celebrate the multiplicity of 
deliberative venues and foster connections between micro and macro strands 
of deliberative democracy. Therefore, it is important to make an integrated 
deliberation system.  
                                            
38 Habermas requires deliberation only in those institutions that are core structures of a 
constitutionally organized democracy. 
39 Jane Mansbridge (1999) suggests that we consider a deliberative system composed of 
multiple venues for deliberation. Hendriks (2006) finds two limitations in Mansbridge’s 
theory. First of all, all forms of deliberation along the deliberative systems are not always 
mutually supportive. Secondly, deliberation is inextricably linked (pp. 497-498). 
40Macro discursive spheres: mobilization of discourse, activism, protest, boycott 
Micro discursive sphere: expert committees, conferences, commissions of inquiry 





While agreeing that deliberation is desirable in many institutions that deal 
with major failures in civil society,41 Gutmann and Thompson also suggest 
the limits of compromise in the domain of grassroots political movement. 
However, Gutmann and Thompson (2004) claim that  
“Because most citizens live most of their lives in civil society outside of 
conventional politics, deliberative theorists seek to structure civil society so as to 
better equip citizens to deliberate in politics (p. 35).”  
Therefore, it is important to consider a way, in which citizens can associate 
freely while improve their deliberation skills. Slightly different from 
Hendriks’s argument, Gutmann and Thompson implicitly differentiate the 
role of deliberation in micro deliberative sphere and macro deliberative 
sphere because an extension could threaten the freedom of citizens and the 
associations they choose to form. 
External deliberation is not always applicable to various forms of 
associations in civil society. For Gutmann and Thompson, they emphasize 
‘compromising mindset.’ In order to promote this mindset, deliberative 
system should be supported by ‘deliberation within 42 ’ and ‘silence 
                                            
41  e.g. The Truth Reconciliation Commission (TRC) case in Africa (Gutmann and 
Thompson 2004, chapter 6).  





yielding’43 in order to make better equipped citizen. The purpose of silences 
is to transform citizen’s attitudes and enhance the quality of deliberations. It 
can be effectively used to communicate a message, value, agreement and 
disagreement.  
Goodin(2003) and Jungkunz(2013)’s ideas help us to conceive concrete 
forms of deliberation, which are supportive of actualizing Gutmann and 
Thompson’s concept of compromising mindset. Goodin (2003) offers 
‘democratic deliberation within’ as a solution to the great challenge is how 
to implement that deliberative ideal among the millions of people at once. 
He suggests that people simply imagine themselves in the position of 
various other and ask ‘what would they say about this proposal?’ He 
concludes that deliberation after informing the democratic imaginary help 
people to become more empathetic and more considered. In other words, 
this kind of internal deliberation makes civil society to become more 
reflective.  
Activism is an inherent part of progressive politics. It is a struggling 
strategy for inclusion. But as stated, it is another form of exclusion.44 In 
order to solve this irony, Jungkunz(2013) presents the concept of ‘silent 
                                            
43 Jungkunz, “Deliberate Silences.” 





yielding.’ Especially, the author suggest that the concept of deliberate 
yielding is important case in LGBT movement. Silences make deliberative 
democracy can be used as temporary tactics for bringing more voices to the 
table. For the author, deliberate silences combine intentionality, 
meaningfulness, thoughtful engagement, and robust commitment to 
inclusion. Without silences, sociality would break down. By understanding 
the importance of silence, citizens who simply fight for their own interests 
can be changed to the direction of common.  
Deliberation cannot play an important role in all phases of a political 
decision process. A deliberative system should promote compromising 
mindset while allowing various forms of associations in civil societies. 
Therefore, deliberative institutions should be supported by ‘deliberation 
within’ and ‘silent yielding’ of civil society. By these processes, excluded 






III. The Nature of Political Contestation 
 
 
Gutmann and Thompson (1996) develop a conception of democracy, in 
which moral discussion takes a central place. Gutmann and Thompson argue 
that moral disagreements are unavoidable. They try to show the kind of 
deliberation that is possible and desirable in solving moral disagreement in 
democracies. According to them, moral conflict can be resolved through 
deliberation because deliberation allows individuals seeking second-order 
beliefs. They argue that the principles of deliberative democracy help 
sustain a conception of democracy with a capacity for moral improvement.  
However, Bell (1999) claims that many important political issues are not 
the in area of moral disagreement. Shapiro (1999), Mansbridge (2010), and 
Goodin (2005) believe that economic interest might be the cause of political 
conflict. Furthermore, Cohen and Rogers (2003) agree that statements of 
self-interest can play an important and legitimate role in deliberation.  
It is important to notice that public good should be not be controlled by 
money or power. It is important to differentiate between the political 
institutions controlled by self-interest and the political institutions that 





democracy makes ample room for bargaining. Bargaining is a deliberatively 
legitimate way of resolving political conflicts that would otherwise remain 
unresolved. Gutmann and Thompson offer political process, which can be 
summarized as following: deliberation first and bargain. If suitably 
constrained, self-interests ought to be part of the deliberation that eventuates 
in a democratic decision.45 In addition to Gutmann and Thompson’s idea, 
many scholars think that stating self-interest during deliberation is important. 
Self-interest may not be a dominant player but it should be clearly stated in 




1. Moral Conflict 
Many normative theorists have emphasized the power of deliberation to 
transform individual participants’ perceptions and even identities in the 
direction of the common good. They believe that legitimating self-interest 
undermines the capacity to inspire transformations in the direction of the 
common good.  
Gutmann and Thompson (1996) mainly concern about “why moral 
                                            





conflict cannot be avoided in politics, and what should be done about it,” as 
subtitle states. They address that the problem of moral disagreement is the 
most formidable issue because, while the content of particular 
disagreements shifts over time, moral disagreement is an unchanging 
condition of democratic politics. Therefore, their theory on deliberative 
democracy takes moral disagreement seriously for the principles and 
practices of democracy. Hume suggests that if social resource are less scars 
and human nature are more generous, moral conflict would not happen. In 
addition to Hume’ two circumstances of moral conflict, they add 
incompatible values and incomplete understanding in definition of morality. 
They argue that, even if self-interest influences the positions that citizens 
take in dispute, it does not completely determine them. Even if economic 
interest correlated perfectly with political positions, the issue would not be 
reducible to economic interest.  
Gutmann and Thompson (1996) insist that deliberators should make only 
arguments that treat all citizens as equals. They would exclude appeals to 
various religious views and to principles such as economic liberty.  
Gutmann and Thompson (1996) argue that a political system based on 
deliberative democracy will increase public-spirited behavior and lead 





Gutmann and Thompson differentiate reciprocity from prudence and 
impartiality. 46 Gutmann and Thompson argue that deliberative democracy 
must make room for political bargaining. But they state that the principle of 
prudence cannot be the principle that ultimately governs disagreement in a 
democracy. On a bargaining, citizens do not have any reason to promote the 
well-being of other citizens and care only about their own interests.47  On 
the other hand, the goal of establishing a comprehensive view is not 
confined to impartiality since toleration does not provide positive basis on 
which citizens can expect to resolve their moral disagreements in the future. 
Together, they emphasize that principled prudence and mutual respect 
increase the chances that the general value of compromise.  
Gutmann and Thompson (1999) argue that the aim of a deliberative 
process is not necessarily to coerce citizens to change their first-order moral 
                                            
46 Table from Gutmann and Thompson (1996, p53). 
 
Principle Justification Motive Process Goal 
Prudence Mutually 
advantageous 
self-interest Bargaining Modus vivendi 






altruism Demonstration Comprehensive view 
 





beliefs. It is rather to encourage them to discover what aspects of those 
beliefs could be accepted as principles and politics by other citizens, who 
hold fundamentally different perspectives. Since it is this second-order 
agreement that citizens should seek, individuals do not have to trade-off 
their personal moral views against public values. However, citizens should 
not expect to resolve all moral conflicts. The resolutions are partial and 
tentative. It is clear that deliberative democrats have no special access to 
moral truth and no special authority to impose their own judgments about 
moral truth on other people by means of laws and policies.  
Some people raise a question on making compromise of moral principles. 
George Santayana captures the dual nature of the aversion felt toward 
compromise of moral principles.48 First of all, it may bring out the feeling 
of surrender. Secondly, the confusion is almost impossible to avoid. Some 
skeptics point out that deliberation undermines political stability because 
deliberative democracy opens all principle and practices to challenge on 
moral terms. Wertheimer (1999) suggests that Gutmann and Thompson 
underemphasize the difference between deliberation and accommodation. 
Galston (1999) argues that toleration is the best way to deal with religious 
difference. Margalit(2009) supports compromises that permit cruelty and 
                                            





humiliation for an entire generation if the long-term benefits are great 
enough. 
According to Gutmann and Thompson (2004), those criticisms 
misconstrue the practical implications of provisionality. Deliberative 
democracy recognizes that constitutional rights should be more insulated 
than ordinary laws. However, it does not mean that a claim of constitutional 
right should be completely insulated from deliberation. They suggest that 
the degree of institutional insulation depends on the degree of confidence 
that people of any particular generation are reasonable to make 
justifications.49 It is considerable merit of deliberative decision making 
process that it is open to change over time, providing a self-correcting 




2. Interest Conflict 
Shapiro (1999) argues that Gutmann and Thompson do not pay attention 
to the ways that moral disagreements are shaped by interest and power. He 
suggests that debates, such as health care reform, are easily dominated and 
                                            





controlled by special interests, which fund misleading public relations 
campaign. Przeworski (1998) says that communication is costly. 
Deliberation can occur only if someone pays for it. 50  Somin (2010) 
suggests that private-sector decision makers have much stronger incentives 
to acquire information and evaluate rationally. Therefore, Somin suggests 
that transferring more decisions to the private sectors is important to reduce 
the range of issues that each citizen must consider. 
Public good should not be controlled by money or power. However, in 
reality, we cannot eradicate the power of economic interests. Anderson and 
Hansen (2007) present result from a Danish national Deliberative Poll on 
the single European currency. 51  Four research questions are analyzed: 
openness and access, the quality of deliberation, efficiency and effectiveness, 
publicity and accountability. From the participants’ responses, the authors 
suggest that deliberative process increase in level of knowledge and an 
improved ability to form reasoned opinions. A mutual understanding on the 
subject matter prevailed among the participants. However, at the same time, 
                                            
50 Przeworski (1998) claims that deliberation can occur only of someone pays for it. 
“Deliberation can be effective only if there is inequality, either of access to specific 
information or of calculating capacity. Add a dose of self-interest, and the mixture will reek 
of “manipulation,” “indoctrination,” “brainwashing,’ whatever one wants to call it (p. 148).  
51Anderson& Hansen follow Fishkin(1990)’s claim that the Deliberative Poll ia a quasi-





self-interest and domination also appeared during the deliberative process. 
According to Anderson and Hansen’s analysis, self-interest is not 
dominant in the process but the use of self-interest is not eliminated from 
the Deliberative Poll on the euro. They argue that the use of arguments 
based on narrow self-interest and the presence of dominating participants 
are also a part of the deliberative process. For example, understanding self-
interest of participants helps to understand the different factors behind 
Denmark’s participation in the single currency and increased responsiveness 
towards the argument of others. 
Gutmann and Thompson suggest that deliberative democracy need to 
make ample room for bargaining. They consider bargaining as a 
deliberatively legitimate way of resolving political conflicts that would 
otherwise remain unresolved. Gutmann and Thompson offer a two-staged 
process - deliberation first and bargain. It can be a guide notion for a 
deliberative system that incorporates other process of political mechanisms, 
such as negotiation and bargaining. A deliberative system should include 
self-interest in deliberation. In order to increase feasibility and desirability, 
deliberative process should be designed in a way that self-interest ideas 
become public and clearly stated.  





changes, self-interest does not imply they are static. Even one’s interests can 
change with one’s identity and one’s own experience (Cohen and Rogers, 
2003). Mansbridge (2003) tries to include greater normative role for self-
interest. The author suggests that deliberations should make participants 
aware of their own interests, the interests of others, and the interests of the 
polity as a whole. Without considering the all these kinds of interests, the 
pressure to frame one’s argument in terms of the common good can distort 
participants’ understandings of the issue, making it difficult to resolve that 
issue through legitimate bargaining. In order to make a deliberative system, 
which is able to manage both moral conflicts and interest conflicts, we need 
to suggest a detailed process.  
Mansbridge et al (2010) develop a three-staged process. In order to deal 
with the complicated situations, deliberation needs to proceed ‘pre-
deliberation,’ ‘full-deliberation,’ and ‘negotiation.’ In the first pre-
deliberative stage, participants can talk about any interest. This stage helps 
to understand themselves. At the second stage of full-scale deliberation, 
individuals, who have both common and conflicting interest, deliberate 
with one another. In this process, people may also understand whether their 
self-interests can be reasoned by moral arguments or not. 





guided by a notion that deliberation should come first, and bargain later. 
Only throughout deliberation, the fundamental problems can be resolved. 
However, in deliberation process, people do not have to solely articulate 
moral arguments. In other words, it is important to provide a stage that any 





IV. The Problem of Deliberative Competence 
 
 
According to Gutmann and Thompson (1996), when people satisfy the 
principles of reciprocity, publicity and accountability, people can facilitate 
debate over fundamental moral values without requiring individuals to 
concede fundamental questions. They assume that each citizen is 
accountable to all in a deliberative forum. That means, Gutmann and 
Thompson have high expectation on lay people’s deliberative competency. 
For them, deliberative competency is a matter of education. They argue that 
democracy cannot thrive without a well-educated citizenry.  
Some critics argue that deliberation may be a burdensome activity. In 
general, deliberative democracy may impose two requirements on voters. 
First, citizens must have empirical knowledge of the policy issues. Second, 
the citizens need philosophical knowledge.52 Many scholarly articles, such 
as Rosen (1996) and Rosenberg (2006) questions on lay people’s 
deliberative competence. Bell (1999) argues that deliberation is an elite 
activity. Critics argue that social and economic disadvantages of members of 
marginalized groups have diminished their capacity for deliberation. 
                                            





Gutmann and Thompson also admit that there are differences in deliberative 
ability among individuals but they argue that the deliberative principle of 
accountability help compensate for the differences. They offer structuring 
group discussions, which allow jurors considering evidence instead of 
simply voting. In deliberation, role of the expertise is important. Experts 
provide scientific and technical information. However, we should not make 
distinction between the role of expertise deliberation and that of lay public. 
Deliberation should include both expertise and lay people at the same time, 
allowing them to deliberate together and hold each other in check.  
In addition, not only by receiving formal education but also by attending 
deliberative forum, people can get deliberative competency. We need to 




1. Democratic Education  
Gutmann and Thompson have high expectations on citizens.  They 
understand lay people as citizens who have democratic virtues, political 
knowledge, and discussion skills.  The coauthors recognize that democracy 





(2004) say the school system in a democracy appropriately aims to prepare 
children to become free and equal citizens, and therefore, it constitutes one 
of the most important sites of rehearsals for deliberation. They argue that  
“Publicly supported and publicly accredited schools should teach future citizens 
the knowledge and skills needed for democratic deliberation (Gutmann and 
Thompson 2004, pg. 35).”  
This idea lead Gutmann and Thompson try to build political and educational 
infrastructure. In Democratic Education, Gutmann emphasizes the role of 
democratic education. According to her, political education is the cultivation 
of the virtues, knowledge, and skills necessary for political participation.  
Gutmann and Thompson (2004) claim that critics tend to overlook the 
fact that disadvantaged groups are able to find representatives who are as 
effective at articulating their interests and ideals within their own ranks. The 
lack of political success of marginalized groups does not stem from a lack of 
deliberative competency, but rather from a lack of power (p. 50). In other 
words, Gutmann and Thompson suppose that people, even in marginalized 
groups, have equal levels of deliberative competency.  
Unlike Gutmann and Thompson’s optimistic view, some scholars 
question on lay public forum. They argue that certain type of people 





and Thomspon have imposed an impossible burden on democratic leaders 
and citizens. 53  Rosenberg (2006) examines the quality of citizen’s 
deliberation and concludes that people typically do not have the capacities 
to meet the basic analytical capacity, rational evaluation, and 
communicative competence. As a result, their deliberations are unlikely to 
be deliberative, democratic or productive. Bobbio (2010) discusses the 
effect of symmetrical models, depending on the degree of information and 
expertise of the different types. In his two models of asymmetrical 
deliberation, he argues that competence differences are revealed among 
participants. Experts, activist, and politicians make more resolute positions 
than ordinary citizens. 
To sum up, Gutmann and Thompson maintain optimistic view on 
developing citizen’s deliberative competence. They assume that people get 
deliberative skills through democratic education. This condition will be 
achieved in future. To achieve this a short run, disciplining a structured form 
of deliberative statements may help lay citizen getting deliberative 
                                            
53 In his critical review of Democracy and Disagreement, Jeffrey Rosen concludes that the 
authors have imposed an impossible burden on democratic leaders and citizens:  “The 
authors deserve credit for their ambitious attempt to bridge the gap between high political 
theory and messy public policy... but their constitution of deliberative democracy is too 
rarified… to be negotiated by citizens or scholars in the rough real world” (“In search of 





competency. For example, Adams (2014) suggests three essential parts of 
reason-giving: a speaker needs to offer conclusion, evidence to support 
conclusions, and an explanation for how the evidence leads to the 
conclusion. He claims that a critical part of reason-giving is tying evidence 
to conclusions.54 It is not problematic when participants share common 
background knowledge. However, that is not a usual situation and a warrant 
is needed to be explicitly stated when participants have different 
backgrounds.55 The author claims that moderators can enhance the quality 
of reason-giving by asking deliberators to draw conclusions and 
encouraging them to think about causal connection.  
Gutmann and Thompson argue that education is important for citizens to 
increase deliberate competence. In addition to providing formal education 




                                            
54 Toulmin (2003) calls a warrant, statements that authorize the steps that an argument 
commits us to. 
55 According to Adams (2012), warrants generally take four types. First, conditional 
warrants explains how implementation of a proposal will lead to some desired outcome. A 
second type of warrant is analogy. Warrants can also take the form of value statement. The 





2. Expert Deliberation  
Bell (1999) argues that Gutmann and Thompson do not consider the 
preconditions for successful implementation of their deliberative principles. 
Bell says that talented elites, who have the motivation and the ability to 
understand and apply moral principle to political controversies, are more 
likely to participate and actualize constructive deliberation. The author 
assumes that not all citizens have the same capacity to apply principles of 
deliberation. He argues that, since the United States lacks the preconditions 
for deliberative democracy, the chances for institutionalizing deliberative 
democracy seem remote from the reality. He argues that defenders of 
deliberation would better institutionalize an elite deliberation called ‘House 
of Scholars.’  
In response to the critic, Gutmann and Thompson claim that Bell’s 
conception of the House of Scholars rejects the basic principle of 
deliberative democracy. First of all, the elite deliberation does not try to 
justify their decisions to anyone but their colleagues. Secondly, it implicitly 
rejects the principle of reciprocity. Gutmann and Thompson claims that  
“Our understanding aims at a society of free and equal citizens and requires 
principles of reciprocity, publicity, and accountability (Gutmann and Thompson 





It is important to remint that deliberative democracy should be no less 
democratic than deliberative.  
According to Gutmann and Thompson,  
“Reciprocity asks that our empirical claims in political argument be consistent 
with reliable methods of inquiry, as these methods are available to us here and now, 
not for all times and places. Neither relativity nor uncertainty is grounds for 
abandoning the most reliable methods of inquiry at our collective disposal. By 
using the most reliable methods of inquiry, we demonstrate our mutual 
commitment to reach deliberative agreement in the empirical realms that are 
relevant to moral argument, (1996, p. 15).” 56  
Although they do not clearly state the role of expertise, Gutmann and 
Thompson suggest that deliberation needs to be informed by appropriate 
empirical evidence. Therefore, a deliberative system should be a process, 
which is provided by appropriate information. In this sense, the role of 
expertise should be specified.  
Warren (2002), Bohman (2000) and Brown (2013) describe the limited 
roles of elite in deliberation. According to Brown (2013), Mark Warren 
claims that, by encouraging flat organizational structures, deliberative 
democracy improves the flow of information and increases socially 
available knowledge. For him, experts need to establish their authority on 
                                            





epistemic grounds, on the basis of which warranted trust in expertise can 
develop (Warren 2002, p.195). However, Brown (2013) points out that, 
when popular translation efforts by experts is emphasized, lay people 
remain passive with respect to expert claims. Also, it is not an easy task for 
experts to persuade large segments of the general public.57  James Bohman 
suggests that the division of labor can be democratic and deliberative in two 
steps. First, expertise need not undermine public deliberation. Secondly, the 
potential dilemmas of mediated communication can be solved in the same 
way as the expertise. However, Brown claims that there is no need to trade-
off between democratic deliberation and expert effectiveness. In a public 
sphere, hierarchy or deference to authority is not necessary in deliberation 
and the boundaries between expert and the lay public need to be 
connected.58  
Brown (2013) suggests that deliberation is an alternative to ignorant mob 
rule and to technocratic rule by experts. Mostly lay citizens are able to reach 
reasonable decisions when they have opportunities to discuss their interest, 
opinion, and experiences. Still, lay citizens do not have scientific knowledge. 
Therefore, they recognize value of specialized knowledge about a particular 
topic. However, they also need to be cautious about information provided by 
                                            
57 Brown (2013), pp. 51- 58.  





expertise. For example, in the US abortions debate, pro-choice and pro-life 
are supported by different kinds of expertise. That means, expertise can 
never answer basic moral and political questions. Therefore, a joint 
deliberation is necessary. This kind of dynamics between experts and 
citizens is suggested in Hendriks (2002)’s analysis of the experience of a 
citizen’s jury held in NSW on the controversial Container Deposit 
Legislation (CDL).  In the forum, interest groups are asked to play the 
expert role. They engage readily in arguments around scientific facts. On the 
contrary, citizens get an opportunity to express for the subjectivity and value 
judgments. By this process, scientific claims are exposed and challenged.  
According to Gutmann and Thompson’s argument, deliberation should be 
democratic. Deliberation should allow lay peoples’ participation. Gutmann 
and Thompson mention that experts must translate their knowledge into 
ordinary language in order for experts to inform deliberation. Following this 
argument, a deliberative system should include a process, in which ordinary 
people can get scientific and technical information. Experts may provide 
information but they cannot be asked to provide decisive answers because 
expertise knowledge does not give a definite answers to ethical questions. 
Lay citizens should critically assess the arguments made by experts. A 





3. Educational effect of Forum 
According to Gutmann (1999), she argues that democratic education will 
not be fully realized until citizens have opportunities to exercise discretion 
in daily works and to participate in democratic politics. Gutmann claims that 
we should not conclude that formal education is prior to democratic politics. 
In order to support this claim, it is important to understand that forum itself 
have educational impacts. By attending forums, citizens learn about local 
issue as well as public issues and become more interested to think about the 
policy. Also, people distributes informative materials in forum. People 
develop their deliberative skills by practicing deliberation.  
First of all, citizens keep learning local and public issues from forums. 
Some practitioners develop a model for learning and practicing deliberation 
throughout neighborhoods, cities and towns, states, school districts, college 
campuses, and other communities For example, Scully and McCoy (2003) 
explain how the Study Circles Resource Center plays a leading role in 
connecting deliberation to individual and community, making institutional 
and policy change in the United States. David Mathews (2014) says that the 
most powerful insight from the NIF experiment has been the recognition 






Secondly, people turn their attentions and take time to think about certain 
issues. Goodin and Niemeyer (2003) argue that internal reflection might be 
more important than deliberative democrat’s heavy emphasis on the 
discursive components. According to their research, people were asked to 
discuss policy options for the Bloomfield Track, a controversial unimproved 
road running through the Daintree rainforest in the Wet Tropics World 
Heritage.59 On one hand, proponents of the track have consistently appealed 
to the need for access of the Bloomfield community. On the other hand, 
detractors have steadfastly emphasized its direct impact on rainforest and 
the symbolically important abutting reefs. Five policy options were 
provided: (1) Bituminize, upgrading the track to two-wheel-drive, all-
weather standard, (2) upgrade the track to a dirt road suitable for two-wheel-
drive vehicle, (3) stabilize the track, fixing specific trouble spots but leaving 
it as a four-wheel-drive track, (4) status quo, maintaining the track in its 
present conditions as a four-wheel-drive roadway, and (5) close the track 
and rehabilitate the area. According to Goodin and Niemeyer, the last option 
was at the least preferred at first but a change in preference occurred. At the 
end, people strongly prefer closing the track had occurred. In order to find 
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possible factors for the change, jurors were asked to rank four possible 
factors - learning more, listening witness, shift in perspective, and group 
discussion - in order to find why people change their mind. For this question, 
more than 75 percent of people answered ‘learning more’ about the track 
and ‘listening to witness’ were the most important factors. That means, 
deliberation offers participants a chance to care for the community.    
Thirdly, forum distributes informative materials. For example, briefing 
books might be prepared by sponsors of American presidential debates in 
consultation with the stakeholders involved. Munno(2014) presents an 
empirical evaluation of the co-production of a “Statement to the Candidate” 
and a “Voice Guide” for a key U.S Congressional race. Citizens produced 
these materials during an intensive process called “Reclaim of November 
Ohio,” which used the Citizen Jury method of public deliberation. The study 
shows that co-production in the political and electoral arena affect positively 
on citizens’ perception of politics and knowledge.  
Lastly, forum procedure itself is developing. Many empirical scholars 
claim that forum procedure greatly affects the quality of deliberation.60 Yet, 
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premature consensus. The coauthors conclude that any meaningful and legitimate 
representation or synthesis of the results of deliberation should take into account the 





the processes of forum are not fully developed.  
Based on experience, various forums learn more about how to create 
high-quality forums, which provide the public with a stronger voice in 
decision making.61 According to Heierbacher (2014), collaborations with 
government are increasing. In the past, many practitioners worked outside of 
government. This has been gradually changing with innovations like the 
Citizens Initiative Review and Participatory Budgeting. These kinds of 
programs are adopted by local and state governments and collaborative 
works are increasing. Moreover, people utilize technology to develop online 
tools for deliberation, members and funding for forum consistently increase. 
62  
 In sum, Gutmann and Thompson emphasize that democratic deliberative 
competence cannot be fully developed without experience to participate in 
                                                                                                               
Burgess (2013) argue that the results of a deliberative forum are best conceptualized by 
three distinct factors - the initial framing and structuring of the deliberation, the facilitation 
process, and the final collation and analysis of materials by an analyst or host of the 
deliberation. 
61 Heierbacher, “The Next Generation of Our Work.”  
62  According to Hierbacher (2014), AmericaSpeaks, the Deliberative Democracy 
Consortium, Everyday Democracy, the National Issues Forum Institute, the National 
Coalition for Dialogue& Deliberation, and the University of Arizona’s National Institute for 
Civil Discourse organized dialogues in the name of Creating Community Solution and took 





deliberation. Although the effect of deliberation is not proven by 
measurement, the number of forums are increasing and processes of forums 





V. Conclusion: Toward a Sustainable Democracy 
 
 
Deliberative democracy allows strong and slow democracy.63  Strong 
democracy suggests a way of life. Slow democracy is not a call for longer 
time meeting but a care for empowered community.64 Deliberation allows 
citizens to actively state their ideas and to find solutions for mediating 
conflicts in their communities. It is a solution to the problems of 
contemporary fast-track democracy. Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson 
suggest that deliberative democracy affirms the need to justify decisions 
made by citizens and their representatives. Deliberation allows citizens and 
their representatives to continue to reason together when they face moral 
disagreements. Even though those moral conflicts are not resolvable, 
deliberation is more likely than aggregation to produce justifiable agreement 
in the future and to promote mutual respect when no agreement is possible.  
                                            
63 Haas, 2014. The concept of slow democracy took its cue from the slow food movement’s 
principles of localism, community engagement, and sustainability. According to Hass(2014), 
Clark& Teachout (2012) describe juxtapose how top-down forms of political decision 
making often replace citizen deliberation much in the same way that the fast food industry 
has replaced sustainable and local food systems. They both pushes for more self-governing 
and local processes that are inclusive, deliberative, and citizen-powered. 





Gutmann and Thompson argue that deliberation should be extend 
throughout the political process. They call it the land of middle democracy. 
They says deliberation should not be confined to constitutional conventions.  
“Supreme Court opinions, or their theoretical analogues. The forums of 
deliberation in middle democracy embrace virtually any setting in which citizens 
come together on a regular basis to reach collective decisions about public issues-
governmental as well as nongovernmental institutions. They include not only 
legislative sessions, court proceedings, and administrative hearings at all levels of 
government but also meetings of grassroots organizations, professional association, 
shareholders meetings, an citizens’ committees in hospitals and other similar 
institutions (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996).” 
According to the authors, deliberation is not just another activity on the 
list because it leads citizens to modify and improve other activities – making 
the routines of bargaining, campaigning, voting, and other important 
political activities more public-spirited in both process and outcome.65 
Gutmann and Thompson address that, although deliberative democratic 
theory is not committed to particular institutional reform, it eliminates 
biases that derive from unequal wealth and entrenched power in the political 
process (Gutmann and Thompson 2012). 
In my opinion, Gutmann and Thompson underestimate the role of their 
deliberative theory. Gutmann and Thompson do not suggest a concrete form 
                                            





of a deliberative system. Nonetheless, I suggest that their deliberative theory 
should guide the institutionalization of deliberative institutions actively. If 
we keep making efforts on developing deliberative system based Gutmann 
and Thompson’s deliberative theory, we will finally offer a deliberative 
system that gives a remedy to the problems of aggregative mechanisms. 
The central criterion of deliberation is ‘mutual justifiability.’ 66 In reality, 
people tend to avoid deliberation in order to avoid polarization. However, 
the real danger lies in rejection of seeking a solution, even it is tentative. 
Deliberation includes listening, learning and understanding diverse opinions. 
Continued deliberation of clarifying preferences may lead to find mutual 
benefits. In other words, in long-run, deliberation will promote the 
deliberation that empowers citizens, and common understanding.  
The second characteristic of deliberative democracy is that the process 
should be accessible to all the citizens.67 It is related to the principle of 
publicity. In order to build an integrated deliberative system, we have to 
consider the relationship between deliberation and other forms of political 
                                            
66 Gutmann and Thompson 2004, p. 3.  
In addition, Mansbridge(2006) suggests that “free flow” brings those together in a way that 
is efficient and understandable. This free flow required lowering the barriers to frank 
speech through a level of comfort with the situation that encouraged openness, a sense of 
safety, and the capacity for mutual challenge. 





activity. Therefore, in a deliberative system, deliberative institutions should 
be supported by ‘deliberation within’ and ‘silent yielding’ from the civil 
society.   
The third characteristic of deliberative democracy is making a decision 
that is binding for some period. In this respect, Gutmann and Thompson 
(2004) claims that “the deliberative process is not like a talk show or an 
academic seminar (p. 5).” It helps citizens to find common ground in 
complex societies comprising heterogeneous religious, political and ethnic 
identities.  
A deliberative system should be supported by specified forms of 
deliberation. First of all, bipartisan membership is important in order to 
check each position’s extreme voice. Second, the role of ‘deliberation 
within’ and ‘silent yielding’ should be understood. Third, a deliberative 
system should allow any interest to be stated. Finally, it is important to 
institutionalize a joint public forum that involves both expertise and lay 
people at the same time. As more forums are held, people get more 
deliberative competency. A deliberative system makes participants aware of 
implications of their own interests, the interests of others, and the interests 
of the community. People can transform their interest in state of reflection, 





compromising mindset. Although its effects have not proven by a precise 
measurement, forums are increasing and their processes are evolving. We 
learn deliberation through deliberation. Gutmann Thompson’s conception of 
deliberative democracy helps us to build a deliberative system that preserves 
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김 윤 원 
 
 
본 논문은 토의 민주주의에 대한 다양한 논쟁을 살펴보고,  에
이미 거트만과 데니스 톰슨의 토의 민주주의론을 바탕으로 실현 가능한 
토의제도를 구상해 보고자 한다.  토의 민주주의는 정치철학에서 핵심적
인 위치를 차지해 왔으며,  민주주의의 지속가능성을 확보하기 위한 방
안으로 발전해왔다.  존 롤스와 위르겐 하버마스의 이론작업을 시작으로 
하여,  최근에는 다양한 토의 제도의 실험연구와 경험연구가 진행되고 
있다.  하지만 이러한 연구들은 구체적인 원칙과 방향을 기반으로 하지 
않고 이루어 지고 있기 때문에,  연구 결과의 함의와 연구들 간 연계성
을 찾는 것이 어렵고 현대 민주정치에서 토의제도가 갖는 가치가 무엇인
지 명확하게 보여주지 못하고 있다.  이에 따라,  토의가 과연 현대 민
주주의 문제에 해결책을 마련할 수 있는 방안이지 의심하는 목소리가 커
지고 있다.  토의 민주주의는 현대의 정치적 위기를 극복하려는 시도로 
그 의의를 인정받고 받았지만,  토의 민주주의론이 앞으로 더 발전하기 
위해서는 토의의 실질적 제도화 방안을 마련할 수 있어야 한다.    
거트만과 톰슨은 도덕적 불일치를 도덕적 불일치를 극복하기 위





중간수준의 토의 민주주의는 제헌회의나 연방대법원의 논의에 국한되지 
않고,  정치의 전 과정으로 확장될 것을 요구한다.  거트만과 톰슨이 제
시하는 토의민주주의는 절차적 원칙과 실질적 원칙들을 모두 포함하고 
있다.  정치과정을 규제하는 중요 원칙들로 상호성,  공개성,  책임성을,  
그리고 정책 내용을 규제하는 원칙들로 기본적 자유,  기본적 기회,  공
정한 기회를 제시한다.  거트만과 톰슨을 이를 통해서,  모든 시민이 잠
정적으로나마 인정할 수 있는 정당한 결정을 할 수 있게 도와 준다고 주
장한다.  거트만과 톰슨은 자신들이 제시한 토의 원칙이 모든 정치 과정
을 평가하고 비판하는 역할을 할 수 있다고 제시한다.  하지만 거트만과 
톰슨은 구체적인 토의 제도를 제시하지 않고 있다.   
따라서,  이 논문에서는 거트만과 톰슨의 토의 민주주의론과 그
들의 이론에서 파생된 논의들을 연계하여 토의의 원칙을 살펴보고,  다
양한 경험 연구의 결과를 재평가하여,  현실 정치 체제에 필요한 토의 
제도를 제시해 보고자 한다.  이러한 토의제도는 시민들이 서로를 이해
하고 존중할 수 있는 민주정치를 형성하는 기반이 될 것이다.  
 
 
주요어:  토의 민주주의론,  토의제도,  도덕적 불일치 
학번:  2 0 1 3 - 2 2 8 7 3  
